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Human decision making is rarely conducted in temporal isolation. It is often biased and
affected by environmental variables, particularly prior selections. In this study, we used a
task that simulates a real gambling process to explore the effect of the risky features of
a previous selection on subsequent decision making. Compared with decision making
after an advantageous risk-taking situation (Risk_Adv), that after a disadvantageous
risk-taking situation (Risk_Disadv) is associated with a longer response time (RT, the
time spent in making decisions) and higher brain activations in the caudate and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Compared with decisions after Risk_Adv, those
after Risk_Disadv in loss trials are associated with higher brain activations in the left
superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the precuneus. Brain activity and relevant RTs
significantly correlated. Overall, people who experience disadvantageous risk-taking
selections tend to focus on current decision making and engage cognitive endeavors
in value evaluation and in the regulation of their risk-taking behaviors during decision
making.
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Introduction
Decision making requires the ability to select from competing actions that are associated with
varying levels of risk and reward. Human decisionmaking is rarely conducted in temporal isolation.
Current choices are always affected by environmental variables and often evaluated depending
on the outcomes preceded by choices (Ernst and Paulus, 2005; Xue et al., 2011; Drugowitsch
et al., 2012). Cumulative evidence has shown that human decision making is affected by previous
selections even when participants are informed that trials are independent and outcomes are
random (Cohen and Aston-Jones, 2005; Hecht et al., 2010; Dong et al., 2014a,b).
Various neuroscience approaches have been recently used to identify the neural mechanisms
underlying risky decision making (Pabst et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2014). Certain brain regions,
such as the inferior frontal gyrus (Cazzell et al., 2012; Fukunaga et al., 2012; Rushworth
et al., 2012; Sheth et al., 2012), can signal subjective risk and facilitate the formation of
subjective feelings during decision making (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Craig, 2009; Cazzell
et al., 2012; Fukunaga et al., 2012). The anterior cingulate cortex has been associated
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with error monitoring, conflict detection, and performance
monitoring in decision making (Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
van Veen et al., 2004; Platt and Huettel, 2008). Other works
have identified risk-related brain regions, such as the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, the insula (Critchley et al., 2001; Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005), and the caudate (Elliott et al., 2003;
Grahn et al., 2009; Foerde and Shohamy, 2011), which are also
responsive to monetary gains and/or losses. The dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior insula are more
active when selecting risky vs. safe options (Paulus et al., 2003;
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Schonberg et al., 2011).
Two aspects affect human decision making. One includes
current decisions from the outcomes (win/loss) of prior
selections. For example, participants who lose in a gamble
are more risky than those who win (Xue et al., 2010, 2011).
Shiv et al. (2005) studied the behavior of healthy controls
and brain-damaged control patients who participated in an
investment game where gains and losses are determined by a
coin toss and found that these individuals tend to quit after
losing. The other is the risky experience in a previous decision
process. The avoidance of risky behaviors, particularly those
related to the experience of loss, is a central feature of decision
making (Rothman and Salovey, 1997). Xue et al. (2010) found
that the insula activates representations of homeostatic states
associated with the experience of risk, which consequently affects
subsequent decisions.
The neuroscience of decision making under risk has focused
on identifying brain systems that shape behavior toward or
against particular choices (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006;
Platt and Huettel, 2008; San Martin et al., 2014). These studies
typically ask participants to choose between a safer, lower-
value option, and a riskier, higher-value option (Coricelli et al.,
2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007; Venkatraman
et al., 2009). The presence of “risk” indicates higher rates to
lose but offers an opportunity to win a large amount (higher
reward). Studies have primarily focused on the brain features
of decision making and rarely on the influence of a previous
selection and their results on current decision making. In the
present study, we explored the effect of risky features in a
previous selection on subsequent decision making at the whole-
brain level by using neuroimaging techniques in conjunction
with a risky decision-making task that simulates a gambling
process. The behavioral and brain reactions of the participants
were measured and compared under different conditions. We
first divided all trials into “advantageous risk-taking (Risk_Adv)”
and “disadvantageous risk-taking (Risk_Disadv)” situations. We
further divided each condition into after-win and after-loss on
the basis of the outcomes of previous selections to explore
the behavioral responses and cognitive mechanisms under this
process. Compared with people who won in a previous decision,
people who lost in a previous decisionmay become frustrated and
cautious in the subsequent selection; hence, the latter group may
need a longer time for decision making. The caudate is important
in the reward circuits and is reportedly involved in anticipation
and performance-related feedback (Seger and Cincotta, 2005;
Tricomi et al., 2006). In the current study, the win/loss will
activate the reward/punishment experience of the participants.
We hypothesized that Risk_DisAdv recruits higher caudate
activations because it offers an opportunity to win a large amount.
During risky decision making, executive inhibition controls
impulse. The anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd and Coles, 2002;
Platt and Huettel, 2008) and the DLPFC (Paulus et al., 2003;
Schonberg et al., 2011) are associated with executive control in
decision making. Thus, we hypothesized that executive control-
related brain regions are involved in the process. In addition,
we aimed to find correlations between brain changes and
relevant behavioral performances because of two reasons. First,
different processes may be operating in parallel during the task.
Interpretation is enhanced if multiple brain regions that show
changes can be linked to separable behavioral effects. Second,
individual differences during a task may not be understood
without measuring behavioral outcomes.
Methods and Materials
Participant Selections
Twenty-two healthy young adults (age: 22.2 ± 1.8 years)
participated in this study. They provided written informed
consent, which was approved by The Human Investigations
Committee at Zhejiang Normal University. None of them
reported current Axis I disorders as assessed, using structured
psychiatric interviews (M.I.N.I.) (Lecrubier et al., 1997) by an
experienced psychiatrist. All subjects are right handed and have
not suffered head injuries with lost of consciousness during their
lifetime.
Task and Procedure
The task used a rapid event-related design. This task consisted
of 80 trials. Each trial was divided into three stages: Decision
stage, Gamble stage, and Feedback stage. Figure 1A shows the
event sequence of each trial during the task. A white cross was
presented at the center of a black screen for 500ms to cue the
beginning of a new trial. During the decision stage, participants
were asked to choose between two risky options (see details
on decision stage in Figure 1B). This selection process would
last for 4000ms at most or will disappear once the participant
made a decision. After a varied period of delay (mean 3000ms,
ranging from 1000 to 5000ms), there came the gamble stage
(Figure 1C). During the gamble stage, participants would see the
backs of 4 cards and be asked to guess which one was red and
indicate their responses by a button press within 2000ms (the
order of the cards during the gamble state was randomized). If
they missed, they would lose 15 Chinese Yuan (about $2.5 USD).
After the response and a delay ranging from 1000 to 3000ms
(mean 2000ms), the selected card would turn over and showed
the feedback to inform participants of the outcome, which would
be presented for a period of 1000ms. Participants would win/lose
the amount according to the card color and the number on
the card. The jitter would be presented after that for 1000–
3000ms. The next trial would begin after a jittered delay (mean
3000ms, ranging from 2000 to 4500ms). The whole experiment
was presented by E-prime software (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc.).
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FIGURE 1 | The timeline of one trial in current study. (A) The timeline of one trial in current study; (B) the detailed information in “Decision” stage; (C) the detailed
information in “Gamble” stage.
Decision Stage
During the decision stage, two lines of cards (each line consists of
4 cards) were presented on the computer screen (see Figure 1B),
with the red color and the amount on it suggesting winning an
amount, and the yellow suggesting losing some amount. The
cards were shown in colors to indicate the results (red, win;
yellow, loss), win/loss rates (the proportions of different color
cards), and win/loss amount (the number on cards).
Advantages/Disadvantageous Risk-taking
Conditions
The probability andmagnitude of the gain/loss were manipulated
to create advantageous/disadvantageous risk-taking selections.
In Figure 1B, the first line is advantageous risk-taking
condition [(45 ∗ 0.75) + (−35 ∗ 0.25) = 25 Yuan]. The
advantageous risk-takingmeans the sum of numbers on red cards
(win) are larger than that in yellow ones (loss). It suggests that
although participants have opportunities to lose a big amount,
they are more likely to win money in the long run. On the
contrary, the second line in Figure 1B is disadvantageous risk-
taking condition: the gross of red card (win) is smaller than that
of all yellow cards [(35 ∗ 0.25) + (−45 ∗ 0.75) = −25 Yuan]. It
suggests that although participants have opportunities to win a
big amount, however, they are more likely to lose money in the
long run. Participants were practiced using the same task before
formal scan.
Participants were told they had 80 times to win some money.
And each trial was presented randomly throughout the task. Each
participant was provided with 200 Chinese Yuan as the initial
balance before the task, and was explicitly informed that he or
she would receive the entire balance in cash at the end of the task.
The win/loss rates of their selections in different conditions were
pseudo-randomized, which was to balance the trial numbers in
different conditions. Subjects were practiced the same task for
15 trials before scan, which is to let them familiar with the task.
The risky features of different conditions were introduced by the
researchers before experiment.
We first defined two different task conditions based on
the risky features of their previous selections: (1) decision
making after advantageous risk-taking trials (Risk_Adv);
(2) decision making after disadvantageous risk-taking
trials (Risk_DisAdv). Second, we further divided each of
these conditions into two different ones, according to the
outcomes of their previous selections: (1) decision making
after advantageous/disadvantageous risk-taking and win
trials (Risk_Adv/DisAdv_Win); (2) decision making after
advantageous/disadvantageous risk-taking and loss trials
(Risk_Adv/DisAdv_Loss).
Participants who chose the same selections for more than 50
percent of all trials (they might have selection bias) or chose
the same selections for more than 10 times (they might be lack
of motivation to perform properly) were excluded from further
analysis. Participants who had less than 10 trials in one of these
four conditions were excluded from further analysis to keep
the statistical power. In this study, we only focused on how
the previous selections and its outcomes would affect current
decision-making process.
Image Acquisition and Pre-processing
The image acquisition parameters have been described previously
(Dong et al., 2013) and are as follows. Structural images
covering the whole brain were collected, via a T1-weighted three-
dimensional spoiled gradient-recalled sequence [176 slices, TR =
1700ms, echo time (TE) = 3.93ms, slice thickness = 1.0mm,
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 364
Dong et al. Risky decision making
skip= 0mm, flip angle= 15◦, inversion time= 1100ms, field of
view (FOV) = 240× 240mm, in-plane resolution = 256× 256).
Functional MRI was performed on a 3T scanner (Siemens Trio)
with a gradient-echo EPI T2 sensitive pulse sequence in 33 slices
(interleaved sequence, 3mm thickness, TR = 2000ms, TE =
30ms, flip angle = 90◦, field of view = 220 × 220mm2, matrix
= 64×64). Stimuli were presented via Invivo synchronous system
(InvivoCompany, www.invivocorp.com/) through a screen in the
head coil, enabling participants to view the stimuli. A total of 630
volumes were acquired for each participant during the 1260 s of
task performance.
First-level Regression Analysis
The functional data were analyzed using SPM5 and Neuroelf
(http://neuroelf.net) as described previously (DeVito et al., 2012;
Dong et al., 2013; Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2013). Images were slice-
timed, corrected, reoriented (manually), and realigned to the
first volume. T1-co-registered volumes were then normalized to
an MNI template and spatially smoothed with a 6mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel. In this study, we only paid attention to the risk
selection process (decision stage). The next stimulus (results of
the decision) was analyzed in other studies.
A general linear model (GLM) was applied to identify
blood oxygen level dependence (BOLD) activation in relation
to separating event types. The six head-movement parameters
derived from the realignment stage were included as covariates
of no interest. In addition, reward history (cumulated win-
lose amount before the present trial), and response history
(stay/switch to previous selections) were included as parameters
in the model to eliminate their potential influence to the
results. For these conditions, the duration is 4000ms. There
are 11 predictors in the model (2 interested conditions:
decision making after advantageous/disadvantageous selections;
and variables of no interest (6 head movement parameters; 2
of the outcomes of previous selection conditions: win, lose; 1
reward history condition (the cumulated amount of the win/lose
balance). Further analysis includes 4 interested conditions:
decision making after Risk_DisAdv Win/lose; decision making
after Risk_Adv Win/lose, and 9 other predictors as described
above. All valid trials were included in the analysis. GLM was
independently applied to each voxel to identify voxels that were
significantly activated for the different events of each condition.
Second-level Group Analysis
Second level analysis treated inter-subject variability as a random
effect. Primarily, we determined to take voxels to show a main
effect in different conditions. Second, we tested for voxels that
showed higher or lower activity in all contrasts of interest. We
first identified clusters of contiguously significant voxels at an
uncorrected threshold p < 0.01, as also used for displaying
purposes in the figures. We then tested these clusters for cluster-
level FWE correction p < 0.01 and the AlphaSim estimation
indicated that clusters with 42 contiguous voxels would achieve
an effective FWE threshold p < 0.01. The smoothing kernel used
during simulating false-positive (noise) maps with AlphaSim
was 6.0mm, and was estimated from the residual fields of the
contrast maps entered into the one-sample t-test. The formula
used to compute the smoothness was that used in FSL (see
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/analysis/techrep/tr00df1/tr00df1/nod
e6.html for more information).
Correlation Analysis
We first compared the brain activations between “Risk_DisAdv”
and “Risk_Adv” and then took the surviving clusters as ROIs
for further analyses. For each ROI, a representative beta value
was obtained by averaging the signal of all the voxels within the
ROI (We took the survived clusters as ROIs for further analysis.
The beta values for each subject were abstracted from grouped
level mask into individual space). We calculated correlations to
support our hypothesis: correlations between the brain activity
(beta value) in caudate in Risk_DisAdv/Risk_DisAdv_Win and
relevant response time (RT); correlation between brain activity
(beta value) in precuneus in Risk_DisAdv_Lose and relevant RT.
Results
Behavioral Performance
The decision-making after Risk_DisAdv showed significant
longer response time (RT, the time they spend in making
decisions in decision stage in current trial) [t(21) = 2.530,
p = 0.019, d = 0.73 than that after Risk_Adv] (Figure 2A).
Further analysis separating these conditions into win and loss,
according to the outcome of their previous selections, showed
that the Risk_DisAdv_Win was associated with longer RT than
that after Risk_Adv_Win [F(3, 19) = 7.076, p = 0.016, η
2
p = 0.05];
the Risk_DisAdv_Lose showed longer RT than Risk_Adv_Lose
[F(3, 19) = 2.474, p = 0.135, η
2
p = 0.12], although it does
not reach statistical significant (Figure 2B). No interactions were
found between advantageous/disadvantageous and win/lose of
previous selections in current study [F(1,21) = 0.243, p =
0.622]. The repeating rates (subjects selected the same risky
feature as their previous selections) in Risk_DisAdv (0.35± 0.13)
were significantly lower than that in Risk_Adv (0.62 ± 0.17)
[t(21) = 2.68, p < 0.01, d = 0.69]. The stay/switch rates after
advantageous and win decisions are 78%: 22% [F(3, 19) = 6.86,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04]; the rates are 67%: 33% [F(3, 19) =
4.69, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.07] in advantageous and lose choices.
In addition, the stay/switch rates in disadvantageous and win
situations are 52%: 48% [F(3, 19) = 1.22, p > 0.05, η
2
p =
0.012]; and it is 34%: 66% in dis-advantageous and lose choices
[F(3, 19) = 5.04, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.05].
Imaging Results
Risk_DisAdv > Risk_Adv in All Trials
Compared with the Risk_Adv, the Risk_DisAdv showed higher
brain activation in the right caudate and right DLPFC (Table 1,
Figure 3A). Significant positive correlation was found between
the brain activity in Caudate in Risk_DisAdv and relevant RT
(Figure 3B). Beta figure showed that Risk_DisAdv elicited higher
brain activity in the Caudate (Figure 3C).
Risk_Adv_Win > Risk_DisAdv_Win
The comparison between Risk_Adv_Win and Risk_DisAdv_Win
showed great similarity to the comparison between Risk_Adv
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FIGURE 2 | Behavioral performances in current study. (A) RT between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv in all trials; (B) RT between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv in
win/lose trials.
FIGURE 3 | Comparison between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv in all trials. (A) Imaging results show the Risk_DisAdv elicited higher brain activation in right
caudate and DLPFC; (B) Correlation between RT and brain activities in Caudate in Risk_DisAdv; (C) Beta figures in caudate in Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv.
and Risk_DisAdv. During the process of Risk_DisAdv_Win,
relative to Risk_Adv_Win, greater BOLD signal was observed in
caudate, and right DLPFC (Table 1, Figure 4A). Marginally
significant positive correlation was found between the
brain activities in caudate in Risk_DisAdv_Win and
relevant RT (Figure 4B). The beta figure showed that the
Risk_DisAdv_Win elicited higher brain activations in caudate
(Figure 4C).
Risk_Adv > Risk_DisAdv after Lose Trials
The Risk_DisAdv_Lose, relative to Risk_Adv_Lose, showed
increased BOLD signal in the left superior temporal gyrus,
and right precuneus (Table 1, Figure 5A). Significant positive
correlation was found between the brain activities in precuneus
in Risk_DisAdv_Lose and relevant RT (Figure 5B). The beta
figure showed that the Risk_DisAdv_Lose elicited higher brain
activations in the Precuneus (Figure 5C).
Discussion
Using a task that simulates real-life gambling, we found that the
risky features of previous selections can affect current decision
making. These effects can be observed in behavioral and brain
activities.
Risk_DisAdv > Risk_Adv in All Trials
The comparison between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv shows
that the risky features of previous decisions can affect current
decision making. Neuroimaging results show that Risk_DisAdv
is associated with high brain activation in the right caudate and
the right DLPFC, which supports our hypothesis. Neuroimaging
and anatomical studies show that the caudate is fundamental to
the selection of behaviors on the basis of the changing values
of goals and knowledge of which actions lead to what outcomes
(Grahn et al., 2009; Foerde and Shohamy, 2011) and whether or
not to trust another person when money is at stake (Elliott et al.,
2003). The caudate is also reportedly involved in anticipation
and performance-related feedback (Seger and Cincotta, 2005;
Tricomi et al., 2006). A recent study that used a guessing task with
monetary outcomes has reported that the caudate is recruited
only when participants believe the existence of contingencies
between their actions and the subsequent results (received a
reward or punishment) (Tricomi and Fiez, 2008). These results
suggest that the caudate performs a role in evaluating values
during decisionmaking. In this study, Risk_DisAdv shows higher
brain activations in the caudate than Risk_Adv. The beta figure
of caudate activation demonstrates that Risk_DisAdv elicits
higher activations than Risk_Adv. In behavioral performance,
the RT in decisions after Risk_DisAdv is considerably longer
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TABLE 1 | Regional brain activity changes in different comparisons.
x, y, za Hemisphere Peak intensity Cluster sizeb Regionc Brodmann’s area
RISK_DISADV > RISK_ADV
15, −6, 24 R 4.289 97 Caudate
42, 36, 12 R 3.892 67 DLPFC 46
RISK_DISADV_WIN > RISK_ADV_WIN
15, −6, 21 R 5.029 142 Caudate
45, 39, 12 R 4.315 94 DLPFC 46
RISK_DISADV_LOSE > RISK_ADV_LOSE
−36, −48, 12 L 4.304 139 Superior temporal gyrus 22
24, −33, 66 R 3.908 89 Precuneus 4
a Peak MNI Coordinates.
b Number of voxels. We first identified clusters of contiguously significant voxels at an uncorrected threshold p < 0.01, as also used for display purposes in the figures. We then tested
these clusters for cluster-level FWE correction p < 0.01 and the AlphaSim estimation indicated that clusters with 42 contiguous voxels would achieve an effective FWE threshold p <
0.01. Voxel size = 3 * 3 * 3.
c The brain regions were referenced to the software Xjview (http://www.alivelearn.net/xjview8) and double checked with atlas.
FIGURE 4 | Comparison between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv in win trials. (A) Imaging results show the Risk_DisAdv_Win elicited higher brain activation in right
caudate and DLPFC; (B) Correlation between RT and brain activities in Caudate in Risk_DisAdv_Win; (C) Beta figures in Caudate in Risk_DisAdv_Win and
Risk_Adv_Win.
than that in decisions after Risk_Adv. RT and brain activations
significantly positively correlate under Risk_DisAdv condition.
This finding indicates that brain activations increase as the time
needed in making decisions is prolonged. We therefore conclude
that people engage more endeavors in value evaluation during
decision making after Risk_DisAdv than after Risk_Adv.
As hypothesized, the right DLPFC is highly activated in
decisionmaking after Risk_DisAdv trials. The DLPFC is involved
in risky decision making (Greene et al., 2001). In addition,
the DLPFC is activated when costs and benefits of alternative
choices are of interest (Duncan and Owen, 2000). Similarly,
the DLPFC evokes a preference toward the most equitable
option and suppresses the temptation to maximize personal
gain when options for choosing alternatives are present (Knoch
and Fehr, 2007). fMRI studies suggest that the right DLPFC
regulates risk-taking behaviors (Ernst and Paulus, 2005). The
transient disruption of the right DLPFC increases risky decision
making in a gambling task (Knoch and Fehr, 2007). These results
support the suggestion that the DLPFC regulates risk-taking
behaviors during decision making. In this study, the decisions
after Risk_DisAdv show higher brain activation in the DLPFC
than those after Risk_Adv. Thus, we conclude that people engage
more cognitive endeavors in regulating their risk-taking behavior
in decisions after Risk_DisAdv trials than after Risk_Adv trials.
The lower repeating rates in Risk_DisAdv than in Risk_Adv
also support the conclusion that people regulate their risk-taking
behaviors.
Risk_DisAdv > Risk_Adv after Win Trials
Further comparison between decision making after Risk_Adv
and Risk_DisAdv after win trials exhibits a marked similarity
to Risk_DisAdv > Risk_Adv in all trials. Neuroimaging results
reveal that Risk_DisAdv_Win shows higher activation than
Risk_Adv_Win in the caudate and the right DLPFC. The beta
figure shows that Risk_DisAdv shows higher brain activations
under_Win conditions. These results will not be discussed in this
study because of the great similarities.
Risk_DisAdv > Risk_Adv in Decisions after Lose
Trials
Compared with decisions after Risk_Adv_Loss, those after
Risk_DisAdv_Loss are associated with higher brain activations
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FIGURE 5 | Comparison between Risk_DisAdv and Risk_Adv in lose trials. (A) Imaging results show the Risk_DisAdv_Win elicited higher brain activation in left
STG and Precuneus; (B) Correlation between RT and brain activities in precuneus in Risk_DisAdv_Lose; (C) Beta figures in precuneus in Risk_DisAdv_Lose and
Risk_Adv_Lose.
in the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and the precuneus.
The STG is involved in the perception of negative emotions
(Bigler et al., 2007; Radua et al., 2010). The negative trend
of activity in the STG reflects a redistribution of resources
from areas implicated in cognitive processing to those directly
involved in emotion processing (Plewnia et al., 2007). In this
study, the higher activity in the STG in decision making
suggests that people experience more negative emotions after
Risk_DisAdv_Loss than after Risk_Adv_Loss. This result also
supports the conclusion that Risk_DisAdv_Loss elicits a higher
negative experience during this process. The higher negative
emotion after Risk_DisAdv_Loss than after Risk_Adv_Loss is
easily understandable because of the money loss involved in the
former situation. Money is also lost after Risk_Adv_Loss, but
the amount lost is considerably smaller in this situation than in
Risk_DisAdv_Loss.
The right precuneus is another brain area that survived after
the comparison between Risk_DisAdv_Loss and Risk_Adv_Loss.
Precuneus activities reflect increased visual attention due to
difficult task demands (Barber and Carter, 2005; Remijnse
et al., 2013). Astafiev (Astafiev et al., 2003) found that the
precuneus is more active in challenging tasks than in simple
tasks. These results suggest that the activity of the precuneus
increases with attentional demands for stimulus detection. In
this study, the higher brain activation in Risk_DisAdv_Loss
than in Risk_Adv_Loss suggests that great attention is engaged
in current selections. In behavioral performance, the trial RT
after Risk_DisAdv_Loss is longer than that after Risk_Adv_Loss,
although the difference is not statistically significant. The positive
correlation between brain activations in Risk_DisAdv_Loss and
relevant RT suggests that longer time engaged in decisionmaking
translates to higher observable precuneus activations.
We therefore conclude that people engage greater attention
in their current decisions after Risk_DisAdv_Loss than after
Risk_Adv_Loss.
Conclusions
People engage greater attention in current decision making after
Risk_DisAdv than after Risk_Adv. Moreover, people engage
more cognitive endeavors in value evaluation and in the
regulation of their risk-taking behaviors after Risk_DisAdv than
after Risk_Adv.
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